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Abstract 
While Latin America’s high levels of chronic violence 
are mostly carried out by poor young men and mostly 
cost the lives of poor young men, the conditions for 
its reproduction are generated by logics of elite 
power and wealth accumulation. Drawing on more 
than 70 interviews with oligarchic elites from 
Colombia and Mexico, the paper offers propositions 
for further empirical research into these logics. It 
discusses why it makes sense to use the term 
“oligarchic elites” to analyse both the failure to invest 
in the rule of law and also the elite preference for a 
fragmented security state whose permeability 
facilitates influence trafficking. It studies the direct 
and indirect relationships between elites and varied 
forms of violence, exploring how they have affected 
the nature of the state in Latin America, the diffusion 
of criminal violences, and the emergence of micro 
criminal orders in many parts of the region. Latin 
America’s history of social action against violences 
– not least disappearances, feminicide, forced 
displacement, and state torture – should extend to 
de-sanctioning violence as a phenomenon. This 
could open up spaces for social and political 
participation to create the conditions of social justice 
which reduce violence. 
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Introduction1 
The poorest in Latin America constitute the majority of victims of violence in the region. 
A telling statistic, for instance, is that there is a one in 50 chance of young males living 
in low-income settings in Latin America being killed before they reach their 31st birthday 
(Moestue et al, 2013). Poor young men tend to be the main victims and perpetrators of 
lethal violence. At the same time, over half of the 25 countries with the highest rates of 
femicide/feminicide in the world are in the Caribbean, Central America, and South 
America (Small Arms Survey, 2012). The majority of victims are poor young women.  
The relationship between poverty and violence in Latin America is widely acknowledged 
(Briceño Leon and Zubillaga, 2002, p.35):  
Even though the privileged sectors of society monopolize the media’s 
attention and impose the violence of regimes of distance and proximity, it is 
the poor who make up most of the victims, as well as most of the aggressors. 
A large part of the urban violence which wounds and kills members of the 
lower strata comes out of those strata themselves: due to poverty, 
discontent, frustrated expectations, making war to survive by holding on to a 
small-scale drug market, or because people do not know how to successfully 
resolve a dispute with a neighbour in an environment in which there is no law 
enforcement. 
However, as Latin America becomes ever more engulfed in a crisis of violence, this paper 
argues that it is time to turn empirically and analytically to the role of elites. This switches 
the focus to the social and economic logics of violence reproduction and away from the 
spaces, territories, and individuals most immediately affected by them. The paper 
analyses how far the rich in Latin America are responsible for the logics behind violence 
reproduction amongst the poorest. It does so conceptually, but with an empirical 
grounding in more than 70 interviews with elites in Colombia and Mexico carried out 
across 2014 and 2015. The crisis of violence in Latin America is also a state security 
crisis. And the latter reflects the kind of state through which Latin American elites – and 
in particular oligarchic elites defined by wealth rather than power and status alone – 
believe best protects and promotes their interests. This state is what I call a ‘fragmented 
security state’, building on Durán Martínez’s (2015) explorations of the links between 
drug trafficking and violence. 
The fragmented security state is a state whose security services offer fractured, 
selective security, whose outcome is the reproduction of violences in society, and 
particularly amongst the poorest sectors. The permeability of this state is what matters 
to elites. They can mostly guarantee personal security through private means. However, 
retaining this permeability to interest trafficking ensures that proven procedures of 
violence reduction, such as an independent and autonomous legal system (Bowen, 2013; 
2017), are only partially on the agenda. The “partiality” privileges the guarantees of 
                                                      
1 This paper was originally delivered at the conference “Los desafíos del desarrollo y la democracia en 
Guatemala: la cooptación del Estado”, Universidad Rafael Landívar, Guatemala City, September 2017. My thanks 
to Patrick Illmer for comments on the first draft. 
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property rights and business transactions over criminal and civil law and rights. Violence 
remains not only part of the state’s policy repertoire, but also unbound by legality. It 
becomes a de facto, everyday tool of political, social and economic interactions. It is 
selectively used with impunity by state security actors and sanctioned by bureaucratic 
and political ones. Some of these state actors choose to ally or do deals with traditional 
and new wealth-accumulating elites, both non-criminal and criminal. The distinction 
between criminal and legal transactions itself becomes blurred.2 Criminal elites 
calculate the advantages and disadvantages of performative acts of violence vis-à-vis 
discrete killings and disappearances. The state security offer further fragments, thereby 
fostering and concealing corruption. By this logic, oligarchic elites, criminal elites, and 
state actors work in mutually advantageous, if fractured and fracturing, symbiosis. 
These processes shape the very nature of the state itself, as well as its commitment and 
capacity to address violence and crime. The solutions which appear to be “centralised” 
rather than part of this fragmented security offer, are those which focus on the poor. 
This is when, for instance, the military or militarised police are sent into poor 
communities to fight gangs and wage a “war on crime”, as has happened increasingly 
over the last two decades, with serious implications for democracy. 
The paper starts by describing the crisis both of violence and of security in Latin 
America. First, this paper locates this crisis in the unfulfilled promise of democratisation 
following transitions from military and authoritarian rule in Latin America as the Cold 
War came to an end. Second, it broaches the difficult question of what we mean by 
“elites”. Third, it examines the relationship of “oligarchic elites", which are the focus of 
this paper, to the central ideas of the Weberian state: violence monopolisation, legality, 
and legitimacy. It then explores the violences important to these elites, investigating how 
their efforts to avoid the everyday violences of the poor impact on the addressing and 
reproduction of violences by the state. Finally, it briefly reviews recent 
reconceptualisations of state-elite relationships, asking what they can tell us about the 
future trajectory of violence in Latin America. While it offers a wide overview, this paper 
is also keenly aware of the peculiarities of particular countries and hopes to foster 
further research into how different contexts can confirm or challenge its propositions. 
Wealth and Violence in Post-Authoritarian Latin America 
This section is concerned with how reconfigurations of power, politics, and 
accumulation in post-authoritarian Latin America relate to the high levels of violence in 
the region, as well as how the latter relate to the ways in which elites have protected their 
economic and political advantages. The discussion is not about causality. Violence 
cannot be reduced to one “cause”. In their contribution to a study on the costs of crime 
and violence in Latin America, Jaitman and Torre (2017, p.31) suggest a puzzling 
anomaly with respect to violence in Latin American and the Caribbean. These countries, 
the authors argue: “are more violent than what their poverty or inequality rates would 
imply”. At least 14 countries saw a decline in the Gini coefficient between 2003 and 2012 
                                                      
2 See Insight Crime’s important case studies of elites and organised crime in Guatemala, Colombia, and 
Honduras (Gutiérrez, 2016; Stone, 2016; Dudley, 2016). 
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(Chioda, 2017, p.7), whereas poverty also declined and the middle class grew.3 The idea 
of an “anomaly” does not quite capture the historic and continuing concentration of 
wealth in the region, despite improvements under conditions of economic growth and 
redistributive left governments. However, it does suggest the need to broaden the range 
of questions posed about the factors that have contributed to the reproduction of 
violence in the region during an epoch of economic growth. While inequality (rather than 
poverty) correlates with violence (cf. Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011), the logics behind this 
are varied. Our concern here is not with how the “disadvantaged” are drawn into violence, 
but rather whether the “advantaged” might be generating the conditions for it. 
Latin America is responsible for 33 per cent of homicides in the world with only 9 per 
cent of the global population (UNODC, 2013; Economist, 2018).4 Violence grew in the 
region throughout the 2000s, despite continuous economic growth between 2000 and 
2012. The annual growth rate of homicides (3.7%) outstripped population growth 
(1.15%) between 2005 and 2012 (Chioda, 2017, p.1). There are variations both intra-
regional and in-country. Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina have levels of homicide much 
lower than Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela (UNODC, 2013, p.22), whereas Central 
America along with Southern Africa represent the sub-regions with the highest homicide 
rates on record, followed by South America, Middle Africa, and the Caribbean (ibid). The 
overall picture points to a serious and persistent problem of violence, yet rarely do elites 
figure in descriptions of the problem. 
The inequality of experience of violences reflects, and in turn impacts on, inequality in 
the provision and quality of security, access to justice, and the range of rights that make 
citizenship meaningful.5 Aside from being the most violent region in the world, Latin 
America remains one of the most unequal in terms of income distribution, in addition to 
ongoing gender and horizontal inequalities around race and ethnicity. Differentiated 
experiences of violences, like social inequality, cannot be disassociated from Latin 
America’s insertion into the global political economy of accumulation, which emerged in 
the 1990s as prolonged periods of military and authoritarian rule were coming to an end. 
This political economy of the “democratic era” has seen disproportionate wealth and 
power accrue to those who dominate markets and property ownership (Oxfam, 2016).6 
                                                      
3 Latin America has always had very high levels of inequality and poverty. Oxfam found (2016) that after the 
bonanza years of the 2000s poverty had declined from 44 per cent of the population in 2002 to 28 per cent in 
2012. Inequality reduced less, but still by 10 per cent: from a Gini of 0.54 in 1999 to 0.486 in 2013. However, in 
2013, some 165 million people – over a quarter of the region’s population – still lived in poverty, with 69 million 
of them indigent. As the boom has ended, these figures may soon increase. For now, a disaggregation of the 
distribution of income, wealth, and land ownership in the world shows that Latin America and the Caribbean is 
the most unequal region in terms of income and land ownership, as well as being one of the most unequal in 
terms of wealth and property. 
4 The Economist puts this differently: 8 per cent of the world’s population and 38 per cent of its criminal killings. 
5
 This paper refers to “violence” as a phenomenon with multiple expressions or plural violences (Pearce, 2016). 
6
 Despite the small reduction in inequality during the boom years, the wealthiest 10 per cent in Latin America 
captured 37 per cent of the region’s total income in 2014. In 2014 the top decile owned 70.8 per cent of wealth 
and property. The concentration is even greater for the wealthiest 1 per cent: this group possesses 41 per cent of 
wealth and property, while just 32 individuals have wealth equal to that of the poorer half of the population. 
Based on Forbes lists of multi-millionaires (2002-2015), the wealth of the top 1 per cent grew on average at an 
annual 21 per cent. That is, six times faster than GDP, which averaged 3.5 per cent a year, and 6 percentage 
points higher than the growth of wealth in the rest of the world. The rich captured the largest share of Latin 
America’s economic growth in the 2000s (Oxfam, 2016). 
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Many (not all) traditional elites managed to adapt to the era of economic and political 
liberalisation. Prevailing global norms turned against all forms of state regulation, 
encouraging instead the privatisation of publicly owned assets. Economic elites found 
new ways to promote and protect their interests and guarantee influence in the 
competitive party politics ushered in with democratisation. The latter also proved 
permissive to the expansion of illegal economic activities. In many countries of the 
region, the illegal economy has played an increasingly important role in funding the 
competitive politics of the post-authoritarian era. 
It is not that crime and illegal trafficking did not exist under authoritarian rule. However, 
they were usually “managed”, serving to lubricate clientelistic networks of state 
patronage. As democratic elections opened up party competition for power, so both 
corporate money and the proceeds of organised crime have been allowed to fund 
electoral campaigns.7 Market opportunities have been gained not through free 
competition but through leverage accrued via elite networks, flows of illegal capital, and 
privileged access to state institutions and contracts. Elites primarily centred on legal 
business pursuits nevertheless cohabit a universe of illegal accumulation, which many 
choose – or have had to choose – to work alongside rather than against.  
The ruptures with Latin America’s authoritarian period should not be exaggerated. 
Studies have pointed to the way military and authoritarian regimes in Latin America 
always involved collaborations between state armed institutions and informal civilian 
and private armed groups. Thus, José Miguel Cruz (2016, p.163) points out with respect 
to Central America’s Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) that: 
It is impossible to understand Central American state violence today without 
recognising that in the past violence was wielded not only by formal 
institutions, but also routinely by informal groups partnering with the state. 
Transitions to “democracy” did not eradicate these precedents in El Salvador 
or Guatemala. 
However, it remains a key question as to why patterns of economic accumulation and 
decades of economic growth in Latin America have not incentivised elite investment in 
the rule of law, or even in a violence-monopolising state through the disarmament of 
private citizens? And why has state violence in the name of “legitimate violence” often 
                                                      
7 This was already apparent in Colombia in the 1980s, where both sides perceived mutual benefits. Colombia 
was only briefly under military government in the 1950s, following its civil war (La Violencia). The two parties 
who fought that war subsequently pacted to alternate in government for sixteen years. As the pact came to an 
end, party contestation opened up again, but by the 1970s drugs money could be used to finance campaigns. 
Castillo (1988, p.224, quoted and translated in Pearce, 1990, p.192) reports a meeting of the Cali mafia in which 
was said: “We have to finance the campaigns of the politicians and keep them on our side. We can participate in 
business without causing a scandal, in family businesses so that they get used to dealing with us. In the end, 
they receive innumerable benefits”. Campaign funding has become a notable form of corruption in many Latin 
American countries. This involves not only illegal drug money but also legal corporations, such as the giant 
Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht, which stands accused of funding numerous election campaigns. 
According to a BBC (2017) report compiled from data from the US Department of Justice, El País and La Prensa 
Gráfica, government officials and politicians in Brazil, Venezuela, Dominican Republic, Panama, Argentina, 
Ecuador, Peru, Guatemala, Colombia, and Mexico have all admitted taking bribes from Odebrecht. There are 
pending allegations in El Salvador, and Chile is under investigation. The former CEO of Odebrecht started a 19 
year prison sentence in Brazil in 2016, while some 70 executives have been imprisoned but agreed plea deals. 
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been outside the rule of law? Many examples also remain of “non-criminalised elites” 
nevertheless resorting to violence to defend their interests. Mining and energy 
companies, for example, have been implicated in many acts of violence against 
indigenous peoples attempting to protect their land. The most notorious recent example 
is the arrest in March 2018 of David Castillo Mejía, executive president of the company 
(Desarrollos Energéticos SA, DESA) building the Agua Zarca dam in Honduras. He stands 
accused of being the intellectual author of the murder of Bertha Caceres, a leading 
campaigner against the project, who was shot in her bedroom in March 2016.  
The role of elites is critical to understanding post-authoritarian violences in Latin 
America. It is to this group that incentives must appeal if the minimum agenda for 
modern Weberian statehood is to be achieved. But we first of all need to consider which 
“elites” we are talking about. 
Which Elites Matter to Violence Reproduction? 
So far, the word “elite” has not been defined. Though this definition is clearly both 
important and complex, this paper can only sketch out key issues. There is a long history 
of debate on how to conceptualise the concentration of power and wealth in the hands 
of the “few” and whether this is inevitable, as classical elite theorists (notably Mosca, 
Pareto and Michels) argued. In the 1960s, a seminar on Elites and Development in Latin 
America culminated in an important collection of essays (Lipset and Solari, 1967). The 
editors’ premise was a reaction to the Marxist analysis of the time, and they propose that 
“whatever the predominant economic structure of a society – feudal, capitalist, state 
collectivist, some other type, or a combination of types – the distinction between elites 
and non-elites will persist” (ibid, p.vii). “Elites versus the masses” has been a persistent 
leitmotiv in the mainstream study of Latin America. Elites can in principle be powerful in 
varied fields: there are religious, labour, and administrative elites, as well as business 
and political elites. 
Contemporary theorists emphasise problems of convergence and disunity amongst 
elites. Referring to political elites in liberal democracies, Higley and Burton (2006, p.7) 
define elites in terms of the capacity of small groups “who are able, by virtue of their 
strategic positions in powerful organisations and movements, to affect political 
outcomes regularly and substantially”. Somewhat echoing North et al (2009), they 
highlight the centrality of elite consensus to the very possibility of liberal democracy, 
alongside the willingness of elites “to moderate their conflicts and hold politics to 
relatively small risks” (ibid, p.202). 
These discussions do not tend to highlight the difference it makes if you have wealth as 
well as status and power, given that these do not necessarily coincide. At the very least, 
power does not always imply wealth, and wealth does not always imply status. Nor do 
they consider how different sources of wealth or power (or both) might originate and 
motivate attitudes towards the state, as well as towards other elites. Preserving the 
status of traditional wealth was one of the tensions between the Medellín Cartel and the 
Medellín elites; the refusal to allow Pablo Escobar membership of the Club Campestre 
ELITES AND VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA 
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(Country Club) is a notorious example. In Latin America, these differences between 
wealth, status, and power matter so much that there is a question mark over whether the 
generic term “elite” should be used at all. The word has metamorphosed over time, and 
conceptually these changing meanings reflect both shifting social attitudes and shifting 
social theory. Marxists have always argued that the word dilutes the real class logics 
behind power and wealth creation; in other words, the relationship to the means of 
production. Yet this relationship has crept back into scholarship as rising global 
inequality has led to new conceptualisations of the nature of economic power in the 21st 
century and new analyses of its social and political impacts. Jeffrey Winters (2011, p.18), 
has made a strong case for using the term oligarchy rather than elite, precisely because 
it draws attention to wealth as the main power resource: 
Wealth is the power resource that defines oligarchs and sets in motion the 
politics and processes of oligarchy. Material power resources provide the 
foundation on which oligarchs stand as formidable political actors…..The 
sheer versatility of material power is what makes it so significant politically. 
I thus prefer (and will here adopt) the term “oligarchic elites”, which addresses Winter’s 
distinction while also preserving the issues of status and power highlighted in the 
classical conceptualisation. The notion of the “defence of wealth” brings us closer to 
why talking about elites and violence leads us to those elites with particular material 
resources to protect. This means understanding such elites also as “agents”, as 
anthropologist Cris Shore (2002, p.4) has explored: 
the very idea of “elites”, suggests qualities of “agency”, “exclusivity”, ”power” 
and an apparent separation from “mass society” – concepts that , in different 
ways, oblige us to consider related themes of stratification, hierarchy, 
brokers and causal agents behind events. Elites thus “represent a way of 
conceiving power in society and attributing responsibility to persons rather 
than to impersonal structures”. (Marcus, 1983:10) [citation in original] 
Shore’s emphasis on agency somewhat challenges the Marxist emphasis on classes as 
structures whose logics relate back to particular modes of production. Shore suggests 
that even within those latter logics, elites have subjective motivations. These are 
connected precisely to power and social status, as well as to wealth and accumulation. 
They generate subjectivities that enable us to ask: what kind of societies emerge when 
agency is exercised by the few in contexts that they both construct and act on? They do 
so according to logics of wealth and ownership, as well as to subjective experiences and 
desires around status, wealth defence, elite reproduction, and inter-elite relationships. 
The literature on elite settlements and pacts assumes agency implicitly, although this is 
rarely researched as such. Shore argues that elites appear in structuralist sociology to 
be a “category” rather than a “group”. Thinking of elites as a category allows for 
differentiation within oligarchic elites as well as between them and other elites. And, as 
Shore points out, the informal dimensions of elites and their interactions, their 
friendships, kinships, their rituals, symbolic and intimate behaviour, also shed light on 
their behaviour and motivations (Shore, 2002, p.11). This potentially allows for empirical 
disaggregation of differential positions on wealth-production processes and rent 
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seeking, on legality and illegality, within the category “elites”. This might provide 
additional insights into how such positioning impacts on attitudes towards violence and 
the rule of law. It enables us to ask when and in what circumstances some oligarchic 
elites might opt for the latter. 
In Latin America, cattle ranchers and plantation owners have been associated with death 
squads and paramilitaries in Chiapas, Mexico, in Córdoba and other regions of Colombia, 
and in the north-east of Brazil.8 As mentioned above, mining and energy companies have 
also used violence against environmental activists and indigenous communities in 
Honduras, with further cases in Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and beyond. In 
Colombia, companies associated with the expansion of African palm in the 1990s and 
2000s have been linked to paramilitary groups and the dispossession of peasants in the 
Chocó and other regions. The construction sector in Latin America has particular 
fortunes to gain from contracts with the State. To what lengths will they go to win and 
protect these? Odebrecht is a Brazilian construction company that gained hugely from 
such contracts, while politicians used the bribes for their electoral campaigns. Here a 
synergy is formed between one economic sector and political elites, both of whom gain 
from ensuring there is no effective rule of law.  In interviews with oligarchic elites from 
the globally oriented financial and manufacturing sectors in Monterrey, Mexico, the 
distinction between businesses dependent on state contracts (construction, for 
example) and those not (beer production) was highlighted by the elites themselves. The 
previous example of cattle ranching and agro-exports are indicative of contexts where a 
sector of the elites might become directly involved in violence. 
These examples point to a research question: how far are the incentives not to invest in 
the rule of law linked to sectoral economic interests and logics as opposed to the 
interests of oligarchic elites within the broad category of elites? When does the defence 
of wealth lead to actual involvement in violence? Winters (2011, pp.24-5) reminds us that 
the latter is always possible: 
The character of oligarchy is inseparable from the nature of the property 
defence regime. When property rights are weak and threats to property 
claims are high, oligarchy becomes more visible because oligarchs engage 
directly and personally in the coercion needed to defeat threats to their 
fortunes. 
Winters (ibid) also highlights the different character of oligarchy under conditions where 
fortunes are highly secure and defended institutionally by a state that maintains a: 
                                                      
8 See, for example, Nizah Richani’s (2013) analysis of the political economy of war and peace in Colombia. He 
quotes an interview with Raul Hasbún, a wealthy banana plantation owner in Urabá, who also became a 
Commander of the AUC paramilitaries/self-defence groups: “…there is no cattle rancher or an owner of (a) 
banana plantation in the rural areas that did not have relationship with the auto-defences” (quoted in Richani, 
2013, p.223). Hasbún has stated that 4,000 agribusinesses in Urabá gave regular financial support to the AUC 
(ibid, p.224). See also the work of Gutiérrez Sanín and Vargas (2017). 
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permanently organised apparatus for violence and holds a reliable monopoly 
on the means of coercion. This shift in the locus of property defence from 
wealthy individuals to an external guarantor dramatically changes the 
character of oligarchy, but does not eliminate oligarchs or oligarchy itself.  
In Latin America, the defence of property and income still requires elite agency and 
shapes the priorities of its oligarchic elites. There is no external guarantor in the state. 
Rather there are individuals to lobby and suborn, in a context where the rule of law is 
weak, public security underfunded, and its agents corruptible. In addition, the emergence 
of illegal rent seeking and trafficking has opened up new routes to rapid wealth 
accumulation, thrusting the successful into an “elite” category in terms of wealth, but 
one whose social status (if less so its money) is compromised and even resisted by 
established elites. Understood in terms of logics of rent seeking and wealth 
accumulation rather than legality and illegality, how do the dominant actors in the legal 
and illegal sectors use and respond to violence?  
In the case of illegal trafficking, the question of violence has been the subject of a 
number of studies. The dramatic rise and often performative character of the violence in 
Mexico and the Northern Triangle has attracted particular attention. Here violence is not 
always associated with organised crime and trafficking, and variations in its use need 
explanation. Durán Martínez (2015) has used the visibility or not of drug-related violence 
to explore the logics behind these variations. She suggests that it is state cohesion as 
opposed to fragmentation of the state security apparatus, on the one hand, and the level 
of competition in the illegal market, on the other, which best explain why violence is used 
and whether it is visible or not (ibid, p.1383, emphasis removed):  
A cohesive state apparatus is likely to reduce the visibility of violence 
because it makes state protection more reliable or enforcement more 
efficient. By contrast, a fragmented security apparatus is likely to increase 
the visibility of violence because it makes protection less predictable or 
enforcement less effective. 
Durán Martínez concludes that “paradoxically a cohesive state more able to enforce the 
law can also successfully protect criminals” (ibid). Latin America’s oligarchic elites 
might prefer a protective state. However, in neither the cohesive nor the fragmented case 
are there incentives to promote a law-based state as such. The protection of interests 
can be achieved bilaterally, i.e. without the mediation of a system of impersonal rules, or 
with a minimum set of such rules for commercial regulation and flexible application of 
criminal law. In Brazil, this has led to what the media have dubbed a “guerra jurídica” 
(judicial war) centred on the detention of former President Lula in April 2018. In the case 
of criminals, “a cohesive protector state deters criminals from using visible violence that 
could force the state to act” (ibid, p.1383). This might explain why in Medellín, the local 
combos (criminal gangs) have accepted the municipality’s aim of reducing homicides. 
Permission of the combo leader is required to “murder”.9 Meanwhile, extortion continues 
with impunity. 
                                                      
9 Field interviews, Comuna 1, 2015. 
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In Latin America, it is the fragmentation of the state security apparatus which stands 
out.10 The transitions to democracy in Latin America eroded the containment model of 
authoritarian control and selective violence (against political oppositions and armed 
insurgents), with variations across the region in terms of elite-state relationships and the 
capacity of outsiders to challenge them. The outcome, with notable exceptions, has been 
a truly vicious cycle of violences. Democratisation cannot be equated with commitment 
to the Weberian state in Latin America. 
Latin American Oligarchic Elites and the Weberian State 
Latin American oligarchic elites in many countries of the region have not embraced the 
principles of the Weberian ideal state. This state is based on the rule of law with capacity 
for infrastructural as well as despotic power (Mann, 1986), as well as the ability to 
monopolise violence legitimately throughout its territory. Infrastructural power might 
include taxation to fund the state and publicly oriented activities, something that is 
systematically resisted in the region.11 It was not long after the transitions to democracy 
during the 1980s and 1990s that political scientists recognised this deficit and its impact 
on democracy. Guillermo O’Donnell (1999, p.313), for instance, highlighted the: 
severe incompleteness of the state, especially of its legal dimension. In most 
cases, in Latin America and elsewhere this incompleteness has increased 
during democratization, at the rhythm of economic crises and the sternly 
antistatist economic policies that prevailed until recently. 
Reflecting conclusions from my own field research, in the same essay (ibid, p.320) he 
also makes the important point that legal and judicial reforms “are strongly oriented 
toward the perceived interests of the dominant sectors (basically domestic and 
international commercial law, some aspects of civil law, and the more purely repressive 
aspects of criminal law)”. Colombia, where competitive electoral politics were re-
introduced after the violence-reducing National Front Pact (1959-1974), did not suffer 
the same forms of authoritarianism found elsewhere in Latin America. This illustrates 
how oligarchic elite interests fail to coalesce around the rule of law despite 
democratisation. While there have been limited advances in civil law, particularly after 
the peace agreement with insurgents in the early 1990s and around the 1991 
Constitution, these have not been promoted by the oligarchic elite, as was clear in my 
interviews with the rector of a leading university and members of the profession. The 
children of those elites that studied law at the country’s top university went on to 
dedicate their time to commercial law. One important issue raised concerned the extent 
to which the efforts to improve civil law from the 1990s onwards came instead from 
children of middle class families who did not necessarily go to the top universities but 
                                                      
10 The deals done between the PRI and drug traffickers under the cohesive Mexican state controlled by that party 
compared to the rise of violence in the 2000s when the PRI lost control of the state underscores the impact of 
fragmentation.  
11
 See for example, the ICEFI study on taxation and elites in Central America (ICEFI, 2011). 
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were willing to take on abuse of power.12 It was they who ensured, for example, that the 
Constitutional Court established in 1991 was partially able to hold to account the 
authoritarianism of President Uribe (2002-2010). Similarly, there have been efforts by 
courageous democratic lawyers to reform courts and the justice system in other Latin 
American countries.13 In an insightful discussion of the varied models of judicial politics 
in Central America, Bowen (2013; 2017) distinguishes between the conventional 
emphasis on judicial independence and “judicial autonomy”. The influence of extra-
governmental actors on the judiciary arguably has even more pernicious effects on the 
prospects of a rule of law to protect ordinary citizens than does a lack of judicial 
independence in inter-institutional terms. 
Access to law remains a privilege in Latin America, as does the ability to manipulate it. 
Social and economic inequality “subvert” the rule of law (Vilhena Vieira, 2015, p.23), 
eroding “reciprocity, both in the moral and the mutual advantage sense, thus impairing 
the integrity of the rule of law” (ibid). Why does the rule of law matter so much? There 
are many reasons, and some are quite complex. Here our concern is with its relationship 
to violence reduction in terms of particular histories of state formation. To emphasise 
the importance of the rule of law is not to equate the law with punitive power, something 
which has undoubtedly been enhanced in Latin America. Prison populations have 
skyrocketed since the early 1990s.14 In a normative sense, the rule of law is a humanising 
project based on reciprocity, whereby value is given to human life and redress is made 
according to transparent rules and evidence when that life is taken. In an historical 
sense, the failure to address violence through legal procedures – resulting in what is 
called “impunity” – does appear to correlate with the rise of violence, as measured in 
homicides.  
In his argument for reducing homicides by 50 per cent over the next 30 years, 
criminologist and historian Manuel Eisner (2015) includes a table on homicide rates and 
the likelihood of criminal conviction in selected countries. It shows, for instance, that 
between 2011 and 2013 the conviction rate in Guatemala was 7 per 100, with a homicide 
rate of 40 homicides per 100,000 people; the figures for El Salvador were 5 per 100 
murders with a homicide rate of 58; Mexico was 18 per 100 with a homicide rate of 22; 
England and Wales had a conviction rate of 79 per 100 (2003/4-2008/9) and a homicide 
rate of 1 per 100,000. In Latin America, criminal conviction (when it does happen) has 
tended to overfill prisons and thus generate spaces for more abuse, criminality, and 
violence reproduction. 
Eisner and others (Eisner, 2014; Cooney, 1997) have argued that the relationship of elites 
to the process of accepting the rule of law was key to the European experience. The 
decline in private intra-elite violence preceded the general decline in male-on-male 
                                                      
12 When I put this in April 2018 in Bogota to an influential public prosecutor (fiscal) of thirty years’ experience, he 
responded: “no es una hipótesis loca” (that is not a mad hypothesis). 
13
 Personal interviews with Guatemalan lawyer Erick Juarez, who I have interviewed repeatedly since the 1990s 
about his efforts to reform legal practice in Quetzaltenango, Guatemala, and beyond. 
14
 In Brazil, the prison population rose from 173,000 in 1995 to over 500,000 in 2017, the fourth highest in the 
world. El Salvador’s prison population rose from 5,000 in 1992 to over 33,000 and Mexico’s from 155,000 to 
239,000 in 2012 (Dudley and Bargent, 2017). 
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homicides (Eisner, 2014). In a study of homicide statistics, Eisner (2003, p.118) 
concluded:  
the transition to lower overall levels of interpersonal criminal violence, one 
might hypothesize, was accompanied by an overproportional withdrawal of 
the elite from the use of physical aggression to seize and defend their 
interests.  
One of the most important variables in this story, was the agreement to hand over the 
task of revenge to a “third party”. When elites opted to address their own conflicts in this 
way, they opened up the possibility of a rule-based – and eventually law-based – 
approach to addressing violence. Eisner draws upon Norberto Elias’s “civilizing process” 
to account for how and why elites opted for this path in early modern Europe (Elias, 1994; 
2005; also Pearce, forthcoming).  This filtered down over many decades to the rest of 
society, and levels of interpersonal violence, particularly male-on-male homicides, 
gradually diminished. This is not an aspect of the European story which conveys a 
“European model” of violence reduction. European elites were also behind violent 
colonial expansion, as well as inter- and intra-state violences, state violence against 
workers and other social movements, and even the genocide of the Holocaust. However, 
in terms of male-on-male interpersonal violences and their decline, Eisner’s 
interpretation highlights the historical centrality of elite incentives to agree in the first 
instance to external adjudication of intra-elite conflicts. 
The evidence that ending impunity correlates with homicide reduction cannot be brushed 
aside, even if this does not account for all violences. Most Latin American countries lack 
not only an impartially administered rule of law, but also security institutions that operate 
effectively while remaining subject to the law. This is only part of the story of the 
relationship of elites to state building and violence management. North et al (2009) 
juxtapose two routes to the latter, one of which leads to “Open Access Orders” where 
violence is limited through institutions and rules that alter the payoffs of violent 
behaviour. By contrast, “Limited Access Orders” are the outcome of the internal 
dynamics of relationships between elites that form part of a dominant coalition. In an 
historical narrative which remains controversial (e.g. Faúndez, 2016), North et al argue 
that elites in Open Access Orders – understood historically rather than conceptually, and 
in terms of powerful individuals and organisational expressions of their social identity 
(North, 2009, p.34) – agreed to cede privileges in exchange for a system of impersonal 
rights. The extent to which the authors have captured how and why the privileged would 
give up privileges is part of the controversy surrounding their narrative. The authors do 
at least contest the idea of the state as “single actor” through their focus on how 
powerful individuals “credibly commit to stop fighting” (ibid, p.18).  Understanding the 
patterns of containment of violence starts with elites rather than imagining the state as 
a “single coercive individual with a monopoly on violence” (ibid, p.259): 
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to understand the control of violence, we must begin with a group of powerful 
individuals, constrained by a set of self-enforcing arrangements, who 
manage to increase the degree of specialisation within their coalition 
organisation by allowing some members to specialise in violence, some in 
economic activities, and some in political activities. 
In Latin America, elites have also entered into various self-interested arrangements of 
different kinds and in different moments. The transitions to democracy themselves were 
described as “elite pacts”. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p.36) defined these as the: 
explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a 
select set of actors which seeks to define (or better to redefine) rules 
governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the 
“vital interests” of those entering into it. 
However, such pacts did not reduce violence, despite the odd exception like the National 
Front Pact in Colombia. It is true that forms of the most publicly visible violences 
changed. From elite-backed state and military directed assassination, torture, and 
“disappearance” of insurgents, democratising oppositions, and social activists in the 
1980s-1990s, there was a shift to (apparently) self-reproducing violence amongst the 
poorest, which some called “new violences” (Briceño Leon and Zubillaga, 2002). 
However, focusing on forms of violence places responsibility on the victims and 
perpetrators rather than on contextual power configurations and their impacts on the 
violences that followed “transitions to democracy” and economic liberalisation. 
Despite considerable investment in judicial and security-sector reform from international 
agencies in the transitional decade and beyond, progress has been weak. The incentives 
to accept “third party” adjudication cannot be induced from the “outside”, it seems. In its 
2017 World Development Report on Governance and the Law, the World Bank (2017, 
p.112) acknowledged that achieving even a minimum bargain around the state 
monopoly of violence is a complex and ongoing task which remains unfulfilled in many 
of the contexts where it works: 
Monopoly of violence is an ideal that few states attain in all places at all 
times. It is the outcome of complex historical processes that unfold over 
decades, if not centuries. The elite bargains that give rise to this monopoly 
are contested, renegotiated, and reasserted every day, everywhere. The 
capacity – the stock of material and technological and human resources 
available to the state – to enforce these bargains and deter groups tempted 
to defect or renege on them is uneven and discontinuous over time and 
space. 
This notion of “uneven and discontinuous” capacity to make and enforce elite bargains 
is one proposition about what is happening in terms of the failure of the monopoly of 
violence, even within the narrow horizon of a “Limited Access Order”. Ruzza and Geisler 
(2016) suggest that one of the biggest challenges today is that non-state armed actors 
are not only bringing violent confrontation and change to states, but also to the wider 
state system itself, and by diverse means. Non-state violence, they argue, can actually 
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mean a more effective – and for some more legitimate – management and control of 
violence than a state monopoly (ibid, p.2). It may well be that state orders are on the 
decline.  
However, once it is conceded that support for either state violence or non-state violence 
implies that the violence practiced can be considered “legitimate” by virtue of social 
acceptance, our gaze is directed away from violence itself. Social acceptance of actors 
who deliver order at any cost is a phenomenon in Latin America (Pearce, 2016). However, 
belief in the “right” of such state or non-state actors to use violence requires contextual 
investigation into the meaning of “right” in contexts of chronic violence and into the 
difference between acceptance and consent. Using acceptance as a measure of 
legitimacy ignores not only the question of “legality”, but also questions of why, where, 
and against whom violence is used. Duncan (2014) prefers to call the social orders 
constructed in peripheral spaces by criminal actors “oligopolies of coercion”. Desmond 
Arias and others speak of “criminal governance”, drawing attention to the way in which 
collaborations between state officials and armed actors produce systems of security 
and order as well as violence and disorder (Arias, 2017, p.6). These ideas help 
problematise “acceptance”. Deeper understanding of these processes, however, needs 
to bring the wealthy and powerful, not just criminal actors, back into the picture. We must 
ask why they are not incentivised to promote a law-based monopoly of violence and 
rather prefer (it seems) to co-exist with these parallel non-state coercive oligopolies and 
cede governance in certain areas to criminals.  
If neither legal rules nor monopolisation are on the horizon in Latin America, 
“legitimisation” becomes even more distant and problematic. Weber’s notion of state 
“legitimacy of violence” is thin. It refers to “belief” in the rightfulness of the use of 
violence by the state, as part of Weber’s search for a non-normative approach to its 
meaning (Pearce, 2017). It has led to precisely the problem that acceptance must mean 
belief in rightfulness, which in turn must mean legitimacy. This has also led to a 
construction of the “legitimate” violence of the “state” as somehow different to other 
violences, as a “good” and “necessary” violence against the “bad” violence of “society” 
(Schinkel, 2010). The yearning for safety from violence and criminality has sometimes 
led to calls for more state violence, in whatever form. The passive acceptance and/or 
active involvement in denying the rights of others in the name of safety and security is 
what I call “authoritarian citizenship” (Pearce, 2016). Social acceptance of a “quick fix” 
to problems of violence and crime, although also violent and outside the law, is not the 
same as “legitimacy”. I agree with Arendt that legitimacy like power must involve a 
measure of consent (Arendt, 1960). Consent is actively and freely constructed through 
non-coerced communication between subjects.  
Belief in the institutions of the state, charged with maintaining “order”, remains very low 
in Latin America. Populations pick up on the fact that those in power do not see the state 
as representing the shared interests of society but rather as guaranteeing the freedom 
to accumulate wealth for those with advantages in the marketplace and property 
ownership. The 2017 LatinoBarómetro poll shows that on average political parties are 
the least trusted public institutions in Latin America (after the church, armed forces, 
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police, electoral institutions, judiciary, government, and congress). The church and the 
armed forces are top with 65 and 46 per cent respectively, while political parties are on 
15 per cent and congress on 22 per cent (LatinoBarómetro, 2017, p.21). In 2017, Brazil 
had dropped to seven per cent confidence in its parties, with Mexico at nine per cent. 
Only Uruguay had the confidence of 25 per cent of the population. In this poll, the 
pollsters also explored the reasons for this lack of confidence, finding that 75 per cent 
of Latin Americans believe that government is carried out for the benefit of a few 
powerful groups. Declining trust in the institutions of politics and the state is one 
outcome of elite disinterest in building institutions that promote and protect shared and 
public goals. This disinterest also reflects elite selectivity over which violences matter. 
Which Violences Matter for Elites? 
The notion that Latin America may not be on a Weberian journey to legitimate violence 
monopolisation by the state has begun to be explored (Centeno, 2002; Pearce, 2010; 
Soifer, 2015; Morcillo Laiz and Weisz, 2016), although alternative conceptualisations 
remain contested. Part of the problem lies in the understanding of “violence”. A great 
deal of the literature is concerned with violent group challenges to the state through 
organised violence. This is the violence that North et al are concerned with in their 
distinction between Limited and Open Access Orders: “the use of violence and threats 
of violence by groups” (North et al, 2009, p.14). However, our concern is with violence as 
a phenomenon (Pearce, 2017) rather than a prior selection of the violences which 
“matter”. It is true that Weber was also concerned with precisely how the state builds its 
monopoly and controls violent challenges to it. He was writing in the wake of interstate 
war and an intrastate uprising in post-war Germany. He did not believe that this 
monopoly would do away with all violences (Anter, 2014). However, nor did he worry 
about these “other” violences which did not challenge the political order as such.  
However, “other” violences can reproduce across all socialisation spaces, from the 
intimate to the street, from the school to the prison, and even in the construction of the 
nation state itself (Pearce, 2007). Latin America illustrates how violence in one 
socialisation space potentially impacts on others. The notion of a “continuum of 
violence” (Scheper Hughes and Bourgeois, 2004) attracts interest but remains 
undeveloped. However, the possibility of intergenerational cycles of violence or 
violences which are chronic and reproduce through time and space is becoming clearer 
(Pearce, 2007; Adams, 2014). At the same time, the state itself acts violently and in ways 
that empty the adjective “legitimate” of all meaning when describing its use of violence. 
A relatively recent example is the case of the 43 students from Ayotzinapa in Mexico 
who disappeared in 2014 and whose bodies have yet to be recovered, even though there 
is much evidence to suggest that they were victims of the state police and army 
(Hernández, 2016). These “other” violences do not appear to matter to oligarchic elites. 
A dichotomy between the Open Access and Limited Access Orders might work with 
respect to forms of centralised management against organised group violence. 
However, it does not account for the diffusion and reproduction of multiple forms of 
“other” violences, even when oligarchic elites are cooperating to secure rents and 
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prevent violent challenges from within and outside the dominant coalition. It is often 
argued that these “other” violences are “social” rather than “political”. However, the Latin 
American examples suggest that the nature of the political context might have 
something to do with the violences outside it, with the weakness of the rule of law being 
but one example. Here oligarchic elites enter the picture again. For instance, histories of 
elite recourse to extrajudicial violences when threatened are likely to have left a legacy 
on the meanings attached to security and violence in societal and political spheres. 
Violence to defend order has been justified by the most powerful in the land. Organised 
criminals use violence to contest and control trafficking routes and territories. Why 
would poor young men – not all of whom will be part of organised crime, though they 
might collaborate with it – not come to see their own violences as equally justified? In 
Latin America, elites select the violences that matter. Faced with insurgent challenges, 
they have accepted and sometimes actively participated in state violence. Significant 
numbers of Latin America’s wealthy have relied on private guards, gunmen (pistoleros), 
and sometimes paramilitary forces and death squads to protect their lands and property 
from cattle thieves, peasant organisations, and insurgents. In Guatemala, landowners 
used – and in some cases piloted – the planes which bombed Ixil communities 
(Rodríguez Pellecer, 2013). More evidence of elite complicity in the violences of the 
Colombian civil war is emerging through the peace process (Dejusticia, 2018). The most 
modern, urban variant is the rise of the private security company. While these are 
commercial companies supposedly subject to the law, most countries in fact have no 
laws for private security providers or have only ineffective mechanisms to enforce such 
laws (Dammert, 2008, p.33). Retired army and police officers often make up a 
considerable part of this lucrative sector, which grew some 8 per cent between 2005 and 
2008 (ibid, p.29) and continues to grow despite its frequent association with corruption 
and abuse. There are over 16,000 private military and security companies (PMSC) in 
Latin America, employing an estimated 2.4 million people (Kinosian and Bosworth, 2018, 
p.3). Private security guards outnumber police four to one in Brazil and five to one in 
Guatemala (ibid). 
The everyday violences of the contemporary era do not touch oligarchic elites in the 
same way that they do poorer citizens. Not only can they choose to live in expensive 
separated/gated communities, they are also prepared to pay for private security in a way 
that they are not for public security. Further, their interest is in their own protection, not 
in what kind of violence is used to achieve that protection. Interviews carried out in 2014 
and 2015 with economic elites in Medellín, Colombia, and Monterrey, Mexico, suggest 
that they take violence more seriously when it touches them personally, as with the threat 
or reality of kidnappings by drug traffickers, which make moving between urban 
residences and weekend farms impossible, for instance. In Monterrey, when the violence 
rose around 2010 – having previously been known for its low level of homicides – and 
began to touch the lives of the economic elites, for a time they invested their own money 
in a new local police force, the Fuerza Civil. In Medellín, with its historically high levels of 
violence, the decision of business elites to take the city’s security seriously came only 
after they too had begun to experience its impact through kidnapping and other threats; 
this was arguably key to the new management of homicides in the city once Sergio 
ELITES AND VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
20 
Fajardo became mayor in 2004.15 There are important contingent moments when elites 
begin to act on the wider environment of violences. However, it is the contingency of 
these moments that matters, as well as their character and durability. These contingent 
moments highlight the norm, which is that public and private security provision in Latin 
America has generated its own violences and abuse, with little or no accountability to 
the rule of law. 
Conceptualising Elite Power and the Violence-Reproducing State in 
Latin America 
Is the very nature of the State in many parts of Latin America changing as a result of the 
apparent “preference” of oligarchic elites for a weak rule of law and private security at a 
time when criminal actors are seeking new points of leverage in the political system? Of 
course, Míguez, Misse, and Isla (2014) are right to question our categories of criminality, 
illegality, and legality. They even suggest (ibid, pp.26-27) that the difference lies only in 
the differential recourse to violence itself: 
The only important difference between legal and illegal/criminal enterprises, 
when the two are not the same thing, is the fact that the latter have to deal 
with their illegality on a regular basis. This is not a small difference, and it 
demands illegal forms of protection. By the same token, while illegal 
enterprises can for the same reason resort to violence, this is avoided by 
legal enterprises that wish to retain their legality. In any case, economic 
rationality and complementary legal resources make the economic action of 
legal and illegal/criminal enterprises very similar. What often makes this 
hard to understand is the moral use of the category “crime”.  
This analysis strengthens the argument that “legal” oligarchic elites enjoy sufficient 
advantage in defence of property rights through commercial law to preclude the need to 
invest in effective and accessible criminal and civil law, which may prejudice their wider 
interests. The fragmented security state offers enough regulation for oligarchic elites to 
protect economic interests, whereas personal ones are protected through private 
security. Political elites gain from the transactional deals which are facilitated by an 
application of accountability that is selective at best. What sort of state order emerges 
as a result? A number of interesting attempts have been made to conceptualise the 
particularities of contemporary statehood in Latin America. They suggest that what is at 
stake is a deeper transformation of the nature of the state itself in the region. 
The big frameworks on offer have to be explored in particular contexts, and every country 
in Latin America has its own distinct history. Some broad threads have been shared over 
the last half century by clusters of countries, but by no means all. These range from 
experiences of civil war, insurgent and counterinsurgent violence, and formal and 
informal peace agreements (Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Peru); 
experiences of transition from military authoritarian to civilian governments (Argentina, 
                                                      
15 See Moncada (2016) for an in-depth study of business, crime, and violence in Medellín and other Latin 
American cities. 
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Paraguay, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile); varied locations in relationship to drug production, 
processing, and organised criminal enterprises, as well as to corridors and routes into 
US and European markets (Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico in the former category, and 
the Northern Triangle, Venezuela, and Brazil in the latter); and experiences of 
redistributionist left governments in the 2000s (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, and Nicaragua). Most countries have relatively high to 
extremely high levels of urban violence, growing local drugs markets, and high levels of 
political corruption, irrespective of governmental regime. Transparency International 
(2017, p.6) reported that three quarters of their respondents in Brazil, Peru, Chile, and 
Venezuela said that corruption was on the rise over the previous twelve months, while 
nearly a third of public-service users in their survey (equivalent to 90 million people) had 
paid a bribe to access such services (ibid). One in five people who had come into contact 
with public hospitals and public schools over the previous twelve months had had to pay 
a bribe. 
It is unlikely that any one conceptual framework could embrace all of the dynamics in 
the region, including the varied legacies of large-scale historical processes on diverse 
rural and urban contexts within countries. However, certain themes are beginning to 
emerge from efforts to build such frameworks. 
One of these is the notion that states have been “captured”. This concept was first 
applied to transition economies in Russian and Eastern Europe (Hellman et al, 2000) and 
later to Mexico (World Bank, 2007). The latter study on Mexico highlighted how political 
and economic transition enabled further concentration of power (ibid, p.viii): 
Although the market‐oriented reforms of the 1990s, such as trade 
liberalization, have brought many benefits to the Mexican economy, in some 
specific instances, these same reforms have yielded fewer results in terms 
of making Mexico more competitive. The most notable example is the 
privatization of the telecom sector, which merely replaced a public monopoly 
with a private monopoly. Market concentration, at least in some sectors, and 
the high level of wealth concentration work hand in hand to make Mexico’s 
political playing field far from level. Economic power translates into political 
influence, and weakens the relative weight of an average voter preference in 
the political process. 
The authors of a study of corporate power in Peru prefer to talk of “political capture”, but 
they emphasise that the assumption that “the survival of democracy depended on 
constraining power in the hands of elites keeping the masses out of political life” 
(Crabtree and Durand, 2017, p.25) has given way to attempts to understand the nature 
of the corrupt use of access to state power. Left parties came to power in Latin America 
in the 2000s as people sought to challenge the domination of elites and force them to 
pay taxes. But their performance has been uneven, subject to accusations of corruption, 
and they have often been forced (or chosen) to negotiate pragmatically with oligarchic 
elites. Bull points out, for instance, that public wealth has been used by President Ortega 
in Nicaragua to guarantee private sector support and to maintain an amicable 
relationship between an ostensibly left government and its business opponents (Bull, 
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2014, p.122). This represents, perhaps, an unusual form of elite pact. A social network 
study of elite power in El Salvador (Waxenecker, 2017, p.63) also emphasises that 
between 1991 and 2001, in the transition from war to peace following the Peace 
Accords: 
The illicit provision of benefits between political and economic elites, the 
inappropriate management of central bank funds and state goods 
undergoing privatisation, the legislative predominance of elites in the 
approval of structural adjustment legislation, and the exclusivity and 
secretiveness of government decision-making are some of the mechanisms 
through which power is realised during this economic transition. These are 
mechanisms inherent to state capture. 
The author goes on to show how this power, entrenched in family relationships as well 
as articulations between business groups and political parties, has left a structured 
hegemonic force able to influence public contracts for services and works, economic 
and financial decisions, and power in the executive and the legislature, even after a left 
government came to power in 2009. El Salvador is one of the most violent countries in 
Latin America. 
There is evidence in a number of countries, therefore, of structured oligarchic elite power 
over the state. Improvements in rule of law are impeded by the fact that the system 
works through secretive mechanisms, private deals over public contracts, and political 
funding as a means of ensuring access to public power. This does not necessarily imply 
homogeneity and cohesion amongst oligarchic elites. Benedict Bull (2014) has explored 
in depth the nature of Central American elites and business groups. She prefers the 
concept of “elite networks” and emphasises the way in which they mobilise four sets of 
resources: money, means of force, information, and ideas and ideologies (including 
religion). She highlights that elites are still prepared to use violence to enforce pacts and 
eliminate opposition in the region. Guatemala is, she argues, the country that stands out 
for the highest incidence of intra-elite violence, due in part to the ongoing role of retired 
military officers in elite networks (Bull, 2014, p.122). 
In their study of drug trafficking, corruption, and states, Garay Salamanca and Salcedo 
Albarán (2015) also bring coercion and violence into the study of state capture, arguing 
that this concept does not sufficiently explain processes observed in Mexico, Colombia, 
and Guatemala. The systemic corruption conveyed by “state capture”, where external 
agents capture officials or formal institutions to pursue economic interests, does not 
cover the cases where illegal armed groups, drug traffickers, and coercion rather than 
bribery (“violent corruption”) have penetrated the state. The authors’ notion of co-opted 
state reconfiguration aims to conceptualise the contexts where lawful and unlawful 
groups participate; where the benefits are not strictly economic but rather judicial, 
political, and social; and where coercive methods and/or political alliances complement 
or displace bribery in different branches of public power and at different levels of public 
administration (ibid, p.4). The authors also use social network analysis to show how 
participant agents establish those durable relationships which enable systematic 
corruption. It is the lasting intersection between the state and organised criminal actors 
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that then reconfigures the state from within.16 The precise relationship between 
organised crime and oligarchic elites requires further empirical and theoretical 
exploration, however. The future of democratic change or violent elite control may well 
emerge from the evolution of this relationship. In the meantime, Latin America’s crisis of 
violence ebbs, flows, and mutates, with extremely unequal consequences for citizens 
living extremely unequal lives. 
Conclusion 
Garay Salamanca and Salcedo Albarán (2015) argue that a deep reconfiguration of the 
state is underway. Others observe that more ad hoc forms of intervention in the political 
order are taking place, aimed both at guaranteeing immunity and at shaping a social 
order favourable to particular territorial and other interests (Duncan, 2014, p.19). 
Desmond Arias (2017) explores four types of micro-level political orders that express 
distinct relationships between state and non-state armed and criminal groups in Latin 
America: criminal disorder, divided governance, collaborated governance, and tiered 
governance. Violence remains embedded in all of these logics and is, in turn, reproduced 
by them. Oligarchic elites and criminal actors appear to accept – if not share – an 
interest in maintaining the apparently “stable instability” emerging from these varied 
logics of the fragmented security state. Its most painful impacts fall on the vulnerable 
and voiceless. 
Elite oligarchs, like criminal actors, need a “property defence regime”. However, in the 
absence of an authoritarian or negotiated variant, they “work on” the fragmented one 
available. Privatised security and visible violences become mechanisms for addressing 
and resolving everyday threats. Oligarchic elites, benefitting more from commercial rules 
and regulations, gain access to the many economic opportunities available from non-
regulated state contracts, labour exploitation, land dispossession, and mineral 
extraction. Criminal actors who neither expect credible protection from the state nor fear 
state action gain incentives to pressure both the state and their rivals through visible 
violence (Durán Martínez, 2015, p.1382). Violent protection itself becomes a commodity 
on sale from criminals, particularly in the poorest communities where neither public 
security nor private security is accessible or benign. Young men in poor communities are 
drawn into this violent accumulation through the gangs they form, through acting as 
informants and enforcers, or through other roles in organised crime. They also absorb 
the culture of a short life lived with high levels of violence, consumption, and excitement: 
the so-called “narcoculture”.  
These logics might not describe detailed dynamics throughout Latin America, but they 
do provide clues to the contexts in which oligarchic elites contribute to the reproduction 
of violence, whether indirectly or directly. The search for responses begins not with the 
elites (though they should not be ignored), but rather with sensibilisation towards 
violence amongst non-elites, from the organised civil society sphere to heterogeneous 
                                                      
16 See the previously cited Insight Crime studies of Colombia, Honduras, and Guatemala for varied permutations 
of elite-criminal actor relationships (Gutiérrez, 2016; Stone, 2016; Dudley, 2016). 
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community spheres.17 This sensibilisation would aim to overcome what is often seen as 
a juxtaposition between negative peace (the absence of violence) and positive peace 
(the presence of social justice). Galtung (1969) rightly pointed out that the absence of 
violence does not imply the presence of social justice. However, this has often led either 
to a justification of violence by those who take a position against the concentration of 
wealth and power or to neglect of the corrosive impacts of violence on the poorest. 
Violence comes to be seen as secondary to the struggle for social justice. This paper 
argues that this is a mistake. Failure to address violences and their mechanisms of 
reproduction through time and space prevents the kind of social and political 
participation that could bring about social justice and address corruption. 
Sustained violence reduction is unlikely to come from elite “enlightenment” or even from 
elite “self-interest”, although these should be encouraged where possible. Elites should 
also be understood in their multiple subjectivities and objective relationships, and the 
contingent possibility of enhanced elite sensibility to violences should not be ruled out 
entirely. However, the impetus needs to come initially from within society, with a 
commitment to the de-sanctioning of violences, where violence is understood as a 
phenomenon (Pearce, 2017; forthcoming). Social action on violence, alongside action to 
build the conditions to live without violence (Pearce, 2017), may be the key to 
constructing a violence-reducing state. Indeed, Latin America is rich in victims’ 
movements, movements against feminicide, and defences of human rights; at their core, 
these are violence de-sanctioning forms of social action. However, these efforts are 
incompatible with the very notion of elite domination of state and society. Ultimately, 
violence reduction must be analysed alongside the enhancement of democratic 
participation and an economy for the common good (e.g. Tirole, 2017). The ongoing 
search for new economic frameworks, however, begs a further question: how can a shift 
in economic horizons be achieved when power is so concentrated in owners of capital? 
How can we achieve an impartially administered rule of law which recognises rights not 
privileges when oligarchic elites lack the historic incentives to build elite agreements? 
Until we find reasonable answers, millions will continue to live in violent spaces 
controlled by organised crime and protection/extortion economies. The search for a 
democratic and non-violent pathway to an “economics of the common good” undistorted 
by elite economic and political power should be one of the most urgent tasks of our time. 
  
                                                      
17 Sensibilisation refers to an increased recognition of the damage and trauma impacted by all violences, not just 
those that matter to the protection and promotion of particular interests or to certain understandings of 
masculinity, for instance. 
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